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Abstract
The Global Forum on transparency and exchange of infor-
mation for tax purposes has undertaken peer reviews on the
implementation of the global standard of exchange of infor-
mation on request, both from the perspective of formalities
available and from the perspective of actual implementa-
tion. In the review reports Global Forum advises jurisdictions
on required amendments of regulations and practices. With
these advices, the Global Forum exercises regulatory author-
ity. The article assesses the legitimacy of the exercise of such
authority by the Global Forum and concludes that the exer-
cise of such authority is not legitimate for the reason that
the rule of law is abused by preventing jurisdictions to
adhere to due process rules.
Keywords: Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of
Information, exercise of regulatory authority, due process
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1 Introduction
In her essay on the validity of global standards in tax law
Ana Paula Dourado takes the position that the lack of
respect for the rule of law disqualifies the OECD stand-
ard for exchange of information on request (‘EOIR
Standard’ or ‘the Standard’) as a global standard.1 Her
main argument is that the current standard jeopardises
taxpayers’ fundamental rights as acknowledged in rule-
of-law states. Her starting point is the coexistence of
plural legal orders within domestic boundaries. In my
own words: various groups in society (constituencies)
may differ about what is right with respect to tax eva-
sion, with the views of ruling authorities, for example,
differing from those of blue-collar labourers.2 The glob-
* Leo Neve is a doctoral student at the Erasmus School of Law, Rotter-
dam.
1. A.P. Dourado, ‘Exchange of Information and Validity of Global Stand-
ards in Tax Law: Abstractionism and Expression or Where the Truth
Lies’, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013:11, 2013.
2. See N. Krisch, ‘The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law’, 17(1) The
European Journal of International Law (2006)
al legal discourse, however, is moving in the direction of
finding solutions for global problems – such as tax eva-
sion through the use of tax havens and secrecy jurisdic-
tions – at a global level, with the trend being towards
setting global standards. That discourse is itself a prod-
uct of global identity and solidarity, along with a sense
of global fairness and unfairness, and global human and
fundamental rights. According to Dourado, the aware-
ness of phenomena such as tax evasion and avoidance by
certain groups of taxpayers, the consequences of bank-
ing and tax secrecy and tax havens for each country
individually, the importance of exchanging information
on tax matters, the right to a fair hearing in tax litiga-
tion, information duties and the principle of nemo tene-
tur se ipsum accusarem are all examples of global prob-
lems demanding global solutions and global tax stand-
ards. In the author’s opinion, uniform standards can
provide uniform solutions in those areas where plural-
ism is not to be favoured.
The concept of the validity of law adopted by Dourado
– from Habermas’ Faktizität3 – is law that is a product
of genuine argumentative interaction among representa-
tives of different legalities. This validity of law as a
product of an argumentative interaction is more difficult
to achieve, however, if the rules are drafted by suprana-
tional legalities, as in the case of the exchange of infor-
mation envisaged by the OECD.4 On this basis, Doura-
do comes to her thesis that legal instruments and action
taken by individual tax administrations have to respect
taxpayers’ rights. For Dourado, validity of law requires
a communicative discourse (with separation of pow-
ers and different legal realities represented), safe-
guards of fundamental taxpayers’ rights and related
limitations on the activity of administration and
courts, a clear prohibition of the use of illicitly
obtained data and the absence of corruption, among
other things.5
3. J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung, Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des
Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt-am-Main,
1992).
4. Dourado, above n. 1, at 3.
5. Ibid., at 9.
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None of these criteria, however, is a condition for
becoming a member of the Global Forum on Transpar-
ency and Exchange of Information (‘Global Transpar-
ency Forum’), and nor is compliance with these criteria
subject to peer review. Ana Dourado therefore ques-
tions the democratic legitimacy of the rules established
by the OECD and the Global Transparency Forum.
The specific provision in tax treaties on the exchange of
information between tax authorities has been in the
Model of Tax Conventions ever since this was first draf-
ted by the League of Nations in 1923. However, the
provision has undergone major changes since 1998,
when the OECD published its report on harmful tax
competition,6 focusing on transparency and the
exchange of information with a view to combating tax
evasion through the use of tax havens and secrecy juris-
dictions. As a result of tax haven jurisdictions’ strong
opposition to the – in their view – one-sided opinion of
the OECD, it was decided that a more inclusive organi-
sation under the auspices of the OECD would be estab-
lished. This organisation became the Global Forum on
Taxation (‘Global Tax Forum’),7 a multilateral frame-
work in which participating countries combine efforts to
work towards a level playing field in the areas of trans-
parency and the exchange of information in tax
matters.8 The Forum started work in 2000 and initially
included OECD countries and the six countries politi-
cally committed to improving transparency and estab-
lishing an effective exchange of information in civil and
criminal tax matters. Its first initiative was to develop a
Model Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax
Matters (TIEA).9 Historically, countries were not
obliged to provide information if their domestic legisla-
tion prohibited the exchange of confidential informa-
tion. However, this recognition of domestic sovereignty
stood in the way of a global solution for tax evasion
through the use of banks and other financial institutions
in secrecy jurisdictions. Under the TIEA, therefore,
jurisdictions were obliged to restrict domestic secrecy
laws that could prevent the exchange of information
relating to foreign residents. The provisions of this
model were subsequently incorporated into the 2005
OECD Model Tax Convention (MTC) and also found
their way into the 2010 UN Model Tax Convention and
6. OECD Report: ‘Harmful Tax Competition, an Emerging Global Issue’,
1998. The report addresses harmful tax practices in the form of tax
havens and harmful preferential tax regimes in OECD member countries
and non-member countries and their dependencies, with a focus on
geographically mobile activities such as financial and other service activ-
ities. It also defines the factors to be used to identify harmful tax practi-
ces and goes on to make 19 wide-ranging recommendations to coun-
teract such practices.
7. The Global Forum on Taxation was restructured and renamed in 2009
by decision of the Council of the OECD establishing the Global Forum
on Transparency and Exchange of Information (‘Global Transparency
Forum’). Decision adopted on 17 September 2009 C(2009)122/Final.
8. A different group of countries is involved in the Global Forum’s work on
tax treaties and transfer pricing.
9. See Tax Co-operation – Towards a Level Playing Field, 2006 Assess-
ment by the Global Forum on Taxation, OECD 2006.
the 2010 Protocol to the Multilateral Convention.10 The
TIEA model has also been widely used to negotiate and
conclude tax information exchange agreements, where
the objective is ‘the creation of an environment in which
all significant financial centres meet the high standards
of transparency and effective exchange of information
on both civil and criminal taxation matters’.11 Central to
the global level playing field between OECD and non-
OECD members is the pursuit of ‘fairness’, meaning
that the high levels of transparency are accepted not
only by the financial centres of the world, but also by
the OECD countries themselves.12 This purpose, in
turn, gave rise to the idea of a review of countries’ legal
and administrative frameworks in the areas of transpar-
ency and exchange of information. The review was
undertaken in the form of a standard questionnaire
developed by the Global Tax Forum and which sought
information on countries’ legal and administrative
frameworks for exchanging information, for obtaining
information held by banks and other financial institu-
tions and for ensuring the availability of ownership and
accounting information and the accessibility of owner-
ship, identity and accounting information.13 The OECD
publication ‘2006 Assessment by the Global Forum on
Taxation’ reflects the outcome of the first factual review
of these frameworks.
In this way the Global Tax Forum has exercised consid-
erable influence on the shaping of the universal rule and
states’ commitment to mutual administrative assistance
in tax matters. However, the rule does not, in itself, cre-
ate a strong compliance pull. Although most countries
will certainly benefit from improved mutual assistance,
others will bear the cost in the form of a higher adminis-
trative burden on their tax administrations and on those
who have the information in their possession, as well as
lower income from tax revenue and fees. It was conse-
quently decided to seek to create a ‘level playing field’,
without any ‘free-riders’. As a result, OECD Member
States such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and Austria
have since been forced to relinquish their bank secrecy,
while this obligation had already been imposed on UK
overseas territories.
By March 2009, almost all jurisdictions had agreed to
implement the new Standard, with heavy pressure and
the threat of countermeasures being necessary to get
some of them to agree. The Global Tax Forum had
been tasked by the G20 with verifying the implementa-
tion of the information exchange provisions among tax
authorities and supplying progress reports on the imple-
mentation of and practice under the new Standard.
After being restructured in September 2009 to strength-
en the implementation of the standards for transparency
and exchange of information, the renamed Global
Transparency Forum launched an ambitious peer
10. Council of Europe/OECD 1988 Convention on Mutual Administrative
Assistance in Tax Matters as Amended by 2010 Protocol.
11. Global Forum meeting, Berlin, June 2004, report.
12. OECD Global Forum meeting, Berlin, June 2004, report para. 6: Defini-
tion of a Global Level Playing Field.
13. OECD, above n. 9, para. 4.
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review process of national legislation in the realm of tax
transparency and, having been instructed to oversee the
compliance and peer review process, has since devel-
oped ‘Terms of Reference’ (see Sections 2 and 3 below).
The first round of peer review reports was completed in
November 2016, with the result that the Global Trans-
parency Forum has now rated 99 of the 116 jurisdictions
that participated in the second phase of reviews. In
order to get a positive rating, some countries have been
forced to amend their legislation on timely and effective
processes of exchange.14 The especially critical proce-
dures in this respect relate to notification of the inten-
tion to exchange information, the possibility of review-
ing decisions to exchange, the length of court proceed-
ings, and the right to be heard with disclosure of docu-
ments. In the process, therefore, of moving towards
positive compliance ratings, interested persons (specifi-
cally the information owner and the subject of the inves-
tigation) have lost valuable legal protection rights.
Examples of countries in which this applies include the
Netherlands, which introduced a bill on 25 September
2013 to amend the International Assistance (Levying of
Taxes) Act.15 This bill proposed abolishing the notifica-
tion procedure and thereby restricting the opportunities
for review by a court. In his explanatory note to the pro-
posed amendment, the State Secretary argued that the
peer review report recommended abolishing this notifi-
cation procedure and also that the new EU Directive on
Administrative Cooperation (DAC 1)16 did not recog-
nise this procedure.17 The amendment also meant that
the person would no longer be able to ask for a judicial
review of the decision to grant the information
request.18 Since 1 January 2014, therefore, the possibili-
ty of a judicial review has no longer been available.19
Just over a year later, on 25 November 2014, Luxem-
bourg introduced legislation to amend its Act of 31
March 2010.20 Under Article 6(1) of the amended legis-
lation, no legal remedy is available against a request for
exchange of information or against a decision ordering
the production of information. The only remedy availa-
ble is against the penalty imposed for not complying
with the order.21 The Luxembourg government, too,
14. Terms of Reference, para. 8: Exchange of information for tax purposes
is effective when reliable information, foreseeably relevant to the tax
requirements of a requesting jurisdiction is available, or can be made
available, in a timely manner and there are legal mechanisms that ena-
ble the information to be obtained and exchanged.
15. Wet Internationale bijstand bij de heffing van belastingen.
16. Directive 2011/16/EU.
17. Parliamentary Papers II 2013/14, 33753, 3, at 10-11.
18. Ibid., at 34-35.
19. That statement was repeated during the parliamentary process of
approving the bill on the implementation of the automatic exchange of
tax rulings, Parliamentary Papers I 2016/17, 34527, B, at 2.
20. Mémorial, Recueil de législation, Appl. No. 214/27, 27 November
2014, at 4170.
21. This issue is now decided in CJEU 16-5-2017, Berlioz Investment Fund
S.A., C-682/15, ECLI:EU:C:2017:373, where the Cour d’appel has
requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. See also Cour d’appel
Luxembourg, 36893C.
argued that the Global Transparency Forum required
Luxembourg to make these changes.22
In its Cahier de droit fiscal international of 2015, the
International Fiscal Association (IFA)23 also identified
Austria, Liechtenstein, Portugal and Switzerland as
jurisdictions under pressure from the Global Transpar-
ency Forum to remove their existing procedures for
notifying taxpayers and their ability to challenge cross-
border exchange of information (EOI).24
On the basis of its Terms of Reference, the Global
Transparency Forum criticised the above countries,
especially on elements dealing with the rights and obli-
gations of taxpayers and third persons. The Forum’s
authority and the strength of its recommendations are
such that these countries were forced to amend their
laws. In that respect, the Global Transparency Forum is
both a rule-maker and rule-adjudicator.
The changes in the laws of these jurisdictions imposed
by the Global Transparency Forum were criticised by
Baker and Pistone, who stated in their general report on
the 2015 IFA conference (subject B) that ‘We would
take the opportunity to note that we find it wholly inap-
propriate that existing and apparently effective protec-
tions for taxpayers’ rights should be removed through
pressure placed on the states concerned.’ In other
words, the authors write that, in seeking to balance the
rights of the persons involved against states’ interests in
an effective exchange of information procedure, the
rights of taxpayers and third persons have been violated.
Baker and Pistone write from the presumption that the
administrative decision to exchange information is an
infringement of a fundamental individual right and
should be subject to judicial review, which cannot be
denied or reduced without serious reasons. This pre-
sumption is based on the fact that information
exchanged may significantly and adversely affect a per-
son’s interests.25
The basic question that this contribution seeks to
answer concerns the Global Transparency Forum’s
legitimacy and authority to impose the above amend-
ments of domestic legislation on member jurisdictions
and third countries. Essentially this involves reflecting
on how an international standard, through the authority
of the Global Transparency Forum, impacts on domes-
tic constitutional rights of the individual (i.e. the right
to be heard and the right to have access to a court) and
on how a standard developed by a network of state
agents is able to prevail over the domestic legislation of a
jurisdiction. My analysis will examine the remarks of
Ana Dourado, as referred to above, from the perspective
22. See Chambre députés, projet loi Doc. parl. 6680; sess. extra ord.
2013-2014 et sess. ord. 2014-2015 and Peer review report on Luxem-
bourg, phase 2, at 103 and 112.
23. For the IFA, see <https:// www. ifa. nl/ Pages/ default. aspx>. The IFA is a
non-governmental and non-sectoral international organization that
offers a forum for experts from different sectors of society to exchange
opinions on topics of international taxation with regard for each other’s
background and responsibilities.
24. See P. Baker and P. Pistone, General Report IFA 2015, ‘The Practical
Protection of Taxpayers’ Fundamental Rights’, at 51.
25. See A.-G. Kokott in Sabou C-276/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:370, para. 51.
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of the taxpayer or third-party information holder sub-
ject to the exchange of information.
The contribution is structured as follows: In order to
come to the core of the answer, I will first look at the
history and authority of the Global Transparency
Forum and its structure, composition and mandate. The
EOIR Standard is reflected in the Terms of Reference
formulated for the peer review procedures, which aim to
monitor and enforce the implementation of the Stand-
ard. Section 2 assesses the legal status of the Terms of
Reference. Section 3 qualifies the exchange of informa-
tion procedure as an act of state, while also explaining
how the rights of defence are fundamental rights of per-
sons involved in the process of exchange of information,
and exploring the legitimacy framework and the struc-
ture in which authority is exercised in the global gover-
nance of tax. Section 4 examines this exercise of global
authority as a form of the global administration of tax,
with discussion of whether principles derived from
global administrative law should apply. The contribu-
tion closes with conclusions in Section 5.
2 Global Transparency Forum
2.1 Introduction
In the introduction I stated that the Global Transparen-
cy Forum is jeopardising the procedural rights of tax-
payers by requiring the relevant state to provide the
requested information without delay and to remove
impediments to the effectiveness of the procedure. This
raises questions about the Global Transparency
Forum’s authority. In this section I will first look into
the institutional aspects of the Global Transparency
Forum, its membership and mandate. The Forum has
developed the EOIR Standard, which is set out in the
Terms of Reference and consists of various components
and elements. Adherence to the Terms of Reference is
subject to peer review, whereby a jurisdiction is assessed
in two phases and ultimately receives a qualification.
The EOIR Standard has to be enforced between juris-
dictions, while rights of citizens are also to be respected.
2.2 Origins
The Global Transparency Forum was created in the
early 2000s as part of the OECD’s work on addressing
the risks that tax havens pose to tax compliance.26 Fol-
lowing the OECD’s 1998 report on harmful tax compe-
tition, OECD member countries and jurisdictions that
had agreed to implement the Standard for Transparency
and Exchange of Information participated in creating
the Global Forum. In 2006 this Forum published a
report (‘Tax Co-operation – Towards a level playing
field, 2006 Assessment’) that referred to the concept of
the ‘level playing field’ as follows: ‘The level playing
field is fundamentally about fairness to which all parties
26. The Global Transparency Forum is the continuation of its predecessor,
the Global Forum on Taxation.
in the Global Forum are committed.’27 That fairness is
meant to exist between OECD member states and non-
member jurisdictions. The point here is that some
important OECD Member States (i.e. Switzerland,
Luxembourg and Austria) were still refusing to imple-
ment provisions for exchanging financial and ownership
information held by banks and other financial institu-
tions. In late 2008, however, newspaper publications on
tax evasion by private persons forced governments to
move forward with the transparency issue. This culmi-
nated in March 2009 in the ‘surrender’ of the above
states and in the elimination of banking secrecy for tax
purposes. As a result, much of the level playing field
was achieved, and the G20, supplementing the OECD,
had taken on a leading role in global tax governance.
2.3 Structure and Composition
The Global Transparency Forum is formally a pro-
gramme under Part II of the OECD budget and has a
self-standing, dedicated secretariat based at the OECD’s
offices in Paris. The OECD itself is an entity under
international law that was established by treaty in 1961.
It currently has 35 members and an annual budget of
€350 million. Exceptionally, nationals of non-OECD
member countries can join the Forum’s secretariat. The
Global Transparency Forum now has 139 members,28
with the conditions for membership being the commit-
ments: (1) to implement the international standard on
transparency and exchange of information on request (as
reflected in the Terms of Reference29 developed by the
Global Transparency Forum); (2) to participate and
contribute to the peer review process; and (3) to con-
tribute to the budget. All members have an equal voice
in the decision-making process and all decisions are tak-
en by consensus. All member jurisdictions have com-
mitted themselves to the EOIR Standard, while 90 of
the 139 members have also committed themselves to the
automatic exchange of information (‘AEOI Standard’).
The Global Transparency Forum is composed of gov-
ernment representatives and is therefore, in institutional
terms, a ‘public network’, with legal personality derived
as part of the OECD and without direct
representation.30 The Global Transparency Forum is
consequently not a formal supranational authority, and
any rules it proposes are not automatically legally bind-
ing. The work of the Global Transparency Forum is
guided and prepared by a steering group.
27. OECD, above n. 9, at 46.
28. At 6 March 2017, see <https:// www. oecd. org/ tax/ transparency/ about -
the -global -forum/ members/ >.
29. Terms of Reference to Monitor and Review Progress towards Transpar-
ency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD, CTPA
2010.
30. For the foundations of ‘networks’ and their impact, see A.-M. Slaughter
and D.T. Zaring, ‘Networking Goes International: An Update’, Wash-
ington & Lee Legal Studies Paper No. 2007-12, Annual Review of Law
& Social Science, Vol. 2, December 2006. Available at SSRN: <http://
ssrn. com/ abstract= 960484>.
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2.4 Mandate
Under the Global Transparency Forum’s original man-
date, which expired on 31 December 2012, the Forum is
charged with promoting effective implementation of the
international standards of transparency and exchange of
information for tax purposes. As set out in the Resolu-
tion establishing the Global Forum, its mission is to
ensure a rapid and effective global implementation of
the standards of transparency and exchange of informa-
tion for tax purposes through in-depth monitoring and
peer review. The original mandate was extended to 31
December 2015, when a new mandate was agreed by the
Council of the OECD. The Global Forum has since
obtained a new mandate from G20 that includes a man-
date to create a mechanism to monitor and review
implementation of the AEOI Standard, and to work to
ensure that developing countries can benefit from this.
This mandate expires on 31 December 2020.
2.5 EOIR Standard
As stated in the introduction, the provision for the
exchange of information on request is not new. Histori-
cally, it was intended for the benefit of applying double
tax agreements (‘small’ assistance clause). In recent
years, however, it has also become a tool for enforcing
domestic tax laws of the requesting state, without any
requirement for a tax interest of the requested state. It
has also extended to cooperation with respect to crimi-
nal tax investigations (‘broad’ assistance clause). Since
2003, the clause has sought to restrict domestic provi-
sions preventing the exchange of information. States can
no longer excuse themselves by claiming not to have the
proper domestic legislation in place to provide informa-
tion or having legislation that prevents an exchange.
The EOIR Standard stipulates that states should have
legislation in place that allows for the exchange of the
requested information to the widest extent possible and
that the receiving authority is bound to protect the con-
fidentiality of the information and must use it for tax
purposes only.31 This ‘speciality clause’, however, has
come under pressure as tax information can also be rele-
vant for suppressing other financial crimes. The ‘tax
purposes only’ label may be lifted with the agreement of
the providing authority, but without requiring any form
of approval by the subject. The EOIR Standard is cur-
rently moving towards becoming an Automatic EOI,
while the new AEOI Standard is being reviewed by the
Global Forum.32
31. These obligations are contained in Article 26(1) OECD MC, with Article
26(3) providing exemptions from the obligations and Article 26(5)
restricting the exemptions provided for in Article 26(3).
32. See more on EOIR Standard: Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conven-
tions, 4th edition by Reimer and Rust (ed.), Kluwer Law International
(2015); X. Oberson, International Exchange of Information in Tax Mat-
ters (Edward Elger, 2015); R. Danon, D. Gutmann, X. Oberson & P.
Pistone (eds.), Modèle de Convention fiscal OCDE concernant le reve-
nu et la fortune, Commentaire (Helbing Lichtenhahn, Editions Francis
Lefebvre 2013); K. Vogel and M. Lehner (eds.), DBA Doppelbesteue-
rungsabkommen, Kommentar, 6. Auflage (Verlag C.H. Beck, München,
2015).
2.6 Terms of Reference
2.6.1 Sources
The Terms of Reference developed by the Global Tax
Forum derive from three different sources. The primary
source is the 2002 Model Agreement on Exchange of
Information on Tax Matters and its Commentary
(TIEA-MA), which includes the EOIR Standard as
developed by the OECD. In addition to this primary
source, the peer review group uses secondary sources in
the form of reports developed by OECD and the Global
Transparency Forum, and which provide context for
understanding and interpreting standards. One of the
important documents in this respect is the standard for
the maintenance of reliable accounting records devised
by the Joint Ad Hoc Group on Accounts in 2005.33
2.6.2 Components and Elements
The Terms of Reference for assessing adherence to the
EOIR Standard contain three basic components, broken
down into ten essential elements. These are:
a. Information that must be available in the requested
state on:
1. Ownership and identity information;
2. Reliable accounting records; and
3. Banking information for all accountholders;
b. Information that must be accessible in the reques-
ted state:
1. The requested state should have the power to
obtain and provide information from any per-
son within their territorial jurisdiction who is
in possession or control of such information;
2. The rights and safeguards (e.g. notification,
appeal rights) that apply to persons in the
requested jurisdiction should be compatible
with effective exchange of information;
c. Both states must have a mechanism for exchange of
information (legal basis) so that:
1. Exchange of information mechanisms provide
for effective exchange of information;
2. The jurisdictions’ network of information
exchange mechanisms cover all relevant part-
ners;
3. The jurisdictions’ mechanisms for exchange of
information have adequate provisions to ensure
the confidentiality of information received;
4. The exchange of information mechanisms
respect the rights and safeguards of taxpayers
and third parties; and
5. The jurisdiction provides information under its
network of agreements in a timely manner.
2.7 Monitoring and Enforcement
These Terms of Reference convert a contracting party’s
commitment to adhere to the EOIR Standard into an
obligation under international law to provide adminis-
trative assistance to a requesting state and to implement
33. Terms of Reference to Monitor and Review Progress towards Transpar-
ency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, OECD, CTPA
2010.
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all such laws that are necessary in order to comply with
the terms. By accepting membership of the Global
Transparency Forum, jurisdictions commit to the
Terms of Reference and become subject to the peer
review process. Jurisdictions’ commitments are based on
that membership and are independent of any treaty obli-
gation. In that respect, the Forum resembles a multilat-
eral convention, but with a stronger enforcement mech-
anism and without any need for parliamentary approval
of the international commitments.
Although the EOIR Standard is not a legal instrument,
the Global Forum monitors both formal and practical
legislative adherence in an attempt to ensure that the
Standard is implemented with no or little deviation. In
the European Union, adherence is enforced by the
Directive on Administrative Cooperation (DAC 1).34 A
number of countries and jurisdictions are stalling with
the implementation of the Standard and not fully apply-
ing it in practice. This has had consequences: some EU
Member States have compiled their own ‘blacklists’,
which were published by the Commission on 17 June
2015 (‘The pan-EU list of third-country non-coopera-
tive jurisdictions’).35 The Top 30 of non-cooperative
jurisdictions consists of countries featuring on at least
ten Member States’ own blacklists. This publication
provoked a strong reaction from the secretariats of the
OECD and Global Forum,36 which explained that the
EU Commission had incorporated the Global Forum’s
Terms of Reference into its principles of good gover-
nance in tax matters. At the same time, however, both
secretariats complained that EU Member States had not
followed the assessments of the Global Forum, while
also claiming that only the Global Forum can assess
countries’ adherence to the exchange of information. It
is unclear as to what extent this reaction from the
OECD and Global Forum secretariats has influenced
individual EU Member States to decide to follow the
assessment of the Global Forum rather than to go it
alone.
Other than ranking a jurisdiction’s compliance, the
Global Forum has no mechanism to enforce a jurisdic-
tion to effectively engage in exchange of information.
The pan-EU list of third-country non-cooperative juris-
dictions, to be prepared by the Code of Conduct
Group,37 allows the European Commission to consider
‘measures’ against non-compliant third states. Although
the list will not be a legally binding instrument, it will
have political force. At the end of 2017 the list will be
added to the Code of Conduct by the ECOFIN
Council.38 The latter can then instruct the Commission
to draft a directive to make the list a legally binding
34. Council Directive 2011/16/EU of 15 February 2011 on administrative
cooperation in the field of taxation and repealing Directive 77/799/EEC,
OJ L 64, 11 March 2011, at 1-12.
35. Press release memo/15/5175 dd 15 June 2015.
36. Letter of 19 June 2015 to Global Forum members.
37. Code of Conduct group, established by ECOFIN Council meeting, 1
December 1997, <http:// ec. europa. eu/ taxation_ customs/ sites/ taxation/
files/ resources/ documents/ coc_ en. pdf>.
38. Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of the European
Union.
instrument. As EU Member States have to transpose
EU directives into their national legislation, any Mem-
ber State failing to implement a directive can be chal-
lenged in an infringement procedure at the EU Court of
Justice (CJEU).39
2.8 Rights of Citizens
The Terms of Reference used as the benchmark for the
peer review process refer only marginally to rights of
citizens. Only B.2 (rights and safeguards of persons in
the requested jurisdiction) has a bearing on basic rights
of citizens. However, the benchmark is formulated to
the effect that rights (notification and appeal rights)
should be restricted insofar as they could hinder an
effective and expedient exchange of information. In the
OECD Commentary on OECD MTC, para 19.11, ref-
erence is made to judicial or administrative procedures
for access to protected information. The Commentary
makes clear that such procedures ‘should not be so bur-
densome [LN: for the requested state] and time-consum-
ing as to act as an impediment to access to banking
information’. It should also be noted that B.2 refers only
to persons in their capacity as information holders in the
requested jurisdiction and does not as such provide
rights to taxpayers. We should additionally bear in mind
that Article 26 of the OECD MTC, when implemented,
provides only for rights and obligations of the contract-
ing states. The addressee of any request made is the
requested state. However, rights of other persons (such
as taxpayers and third-party information holders) can
also be affected by the exchange of information.
An additional issue is that the reference in C.4 to rights
and safeguards of taxpayers and third parties refers
mainly to the obligation of the requesting state to
respect the confidentiality of the information received
and its obligation to use the received information only
for the purposes for which it was requested (purpose
restriction). This reference is not intended to give rights
to the taxpayer or the third party. Similarly, it does not
define the rights that should be respected, except for the
positive obligation on the requesting state to protect the
confidentiality of the received information as an exten-
sion of the confidentiality obligation imposed on the
requested state. We can thus conclude that citizens in
this process cannot derive rights from the provisions in
Article 26 OECD MTC.
2.9 Peer Review
The EOIR Standard is reflected in the Terms of Refer-
ence, with compliance to be ensured through an in-
depth peer review process. All Global Forum members,
as well as jurisdictions identified by the Forum as rele-
vant to its work, will undergo peer reviews of their legal
and regulatory frameworks for transparency and
exchange of information in tax matters and for imple-
menting the standards in practice. As mentioned above,
the EOIR Standard has been broken down into three
main categories, comprising ten essential elements.
39. Article 258 TFEU.
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These make up the Terms of Reference for assessing
compliance and implementation of the EOIR Standard.
The Global Forum has decided that the peer review
process should consist of two phases. The first phase
will assess a jurisdiction’s legal and regulatory frame-
works for exchanging information (i.e. the theoretical
part), while the second phase will assess the jurisdic-
tion’s effective implementation of the EOIR Standard in
practice (i.e. the practical part). The peer review group’s
evaluation reports have to be adopted by all the Global
Forum members, while members are also expected to
act on any recommendations in the review and to report
back to the Global Forum on actions taken.
Once a jurisdiction has undertaken to implement the
international EOIR Standard, it obviously has to pro-
ceed to do so and then to exchange all information ‘fore-
seeably [of] relevance’ for the enforcement of taxes.
This should be defined ‘to the widest possible extent’
without entering the territory of ‘speculative requests’,
being requests that have ‘no apparent nexus to an open
inquiry or investigation’.40 Foreseeably relevant infor-
mation includes accounting information. The Joint Ad
Hoc Group on Accounts (JAHGA) has qualified
‘accounting information’ in its report and has deter-
mined that it applies to ‘Relevant Entities and Arrange-
ments’, which are broadly defined to include: (i) a com-
pany, foundation, Anstalt and any similar structure; (ii)
a partnership or other body of persons; (iii) a trust or
similar arrangement; (iv) a collective investment fund or
scheme; and (v) any person holding assets in a fiduciary
capacity (e.g. an executor in the case of an estate).41 The
JAHGA report therefore more or less imposes a
requirement on jurisdictions hosting entities and
arrangements to be able to make accessible and reliable
accounting records of those entities and arrangements
available. Many jurisdictions (tax havens) have conse-
quently introduced a legal obligation to maintain an
administration. The Global Forum conducts peer
reviews of its member jurisdictions’ ability to cooperate
with other tax administrations in accordance with the
internationally agreed standard.
The peer review group will qualify the level of adher-
ence in phase 1 (the theoretical and substantive phase)
in one of three possible ways: ‘The element is in place’,
‘The element is in place, but certain aspects of the legal
implementation of the element need improvement’ or
‘The element is not in place’. The classifications in
phase 2 (the practical phase) are ‘compliant’, ‘largely
compliant’, ‘partially compliant’ or ‘non-compliant’,
while the classifications in the overall assessment are as
in phase 2.
40. It is questionable whether these terms have autonomous meaning. As
case law in various countries shows, courts in these jurisdictions try to
give a domestic meaning to the terms, but this plurality of meanings is
not accepted by the Global Forum.
41. JAHGA report ‘Enabling Effective Exchange of Information: Availability
Standard and Reliability Standard’ in Tax Co-operation – Towards A
Level Playing Field, OECD 2006, <www. oecd. org/ ctp/ harmful/
42179473. pdf>.
The Global Forum has now completed 235 peer reviews
and assigned compliance ratings to 113 jurisdictions that
have undergone phase 2 reviews. A total of 22 jurisdic-
tions have been rated ‘compliant’, 77 ‘largely compli-
ant’, 12 ‘partially compliant’ and 5 ‘non-compliant’.42
Jurisdictions without sufficient elements in place cannot
move on to phase 2 and so are at risk of countermeas-
ures.
2.10 Section Conclusion
It can be concluded from this section that, from the per-
spective of the OECD and Global Forum, the exchange
of information is a process operating between competent
authorities. This is because the Terms of Reference
refer only to rights and obligations of contracting parties
and make no provision for the subject of the investiga-
tion (i.e. the taxpayer under investigation) or the third-
party information holder. However, the subject and the
information holder have legal rights, too. The exchange
of information concerns the exchange of the taxpayer’s
personal or other information, or information on the
taxpayer originating from the third party. The EOIR
Standard requires a speedy process, without delays
attributable to interference by the subject. The Global
Forum’s focus is clearly not on seeking a balance
between, on the one hand, administrative effectiveness
and, on the other hand, the recognition of basic proce-
dural rights of persons involved, including the judicial
review of acts of state. And this different focus, in turn,
has an impact on the rights of the subject, as we shall see
in the next section.
3 Rights of Defence
3.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the introduction to the contribution,
the perspective for assessing the legitimacy of the peer
review process is that of the person subject to an investi-
gation in the requesting state, with specific regard for
the fairness of the procedure. Under the rule of law, the
rights of defence are some of the most important rights
available to a subject seeking to protect himself against a
governmental decision that severely impacts on the sub-
ject’s basic civil rights. These rights relate to fair treat-
ment and an equitable procedure. The position of the
subject in the EOIR process (in either capacity) must be
recognised as it is the subject’s civil rights that are at
stake. The subject basically has three distinct rights: due
process fairness, confidentiality of personal data, and
data protection. Recognising the procedural rights of the
persons involved in the EOI procedure will often lead to
a delay in the process and will in any event have an
impact on the effectiveness of the administrative proce-
dure. The Global Forum consequently has a clear bias
towards effectiveness over fairness, based on the pre-
42. See: <www. oecd. org/ tax/ transparency/ exchange -of -information -on -
request/ ratings/ >. These five jurisdictions include three jurisdictions that
have not undergone a phase 2 review.
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sumption that the subject can bring his case before the
court in the requesting state. However, this bias leaves
the affected third party without recourse to adjudica-
tion. The following subsections touch upon various
aspects of the rights of defence available to taxpayers
and third parties in the requested state.
3.2 Fundamental Rights of the Taxpayer
The protection of taxpayers’ rights has recently received
much attention.43 Minimum standards (good practice)
and best practices are circulating among authorities and
interested parties. Citizens have basic rights that should
not be neglected in any transnational exchange of infor-
mation, whether under an EU Directive or a bilateral or
multilateral tax convention. The rights that have been
agreed internationally are the right to be informed, the
right to be able to participate in the decision-making
process, the right to be heard in the event of a direct and
immediate impact on the person, the right of access to
judicial review by an independent court, and the right to
privacy and data protection. In a pluralistic legal envi-
ronment, however, these rights are not uniform. If the
rules are to be applied uniformly, it would consequently
be helpful for the instrument providing the legal basis
for the EOI process also to contain basic protection
rights for the persons involved, such as a provision to
the effect that when an exchange of information takes
place under the EU Directive on Administrative Coop-
eration (DAC),44 the affected person has all the rights
and freedoms granted by the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights (ECFR),45 including the freedom of the right
of respect for private and family life (Article 7), protec-
tion of personal data (Article 8), the right to property
(Article 17), the right to good administration (Article
41), the right to access to documents (Article 42), the
right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial (Article
47), and the presumption of innocence and the right of
defence (Article 48). Although these rights and free-
doms are not absolute, any limitation on exercising them
must be provided for by law and must respect the
essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made
only if they are necessary and genuinely meet the objec-
tives of general interest recognised by the Union or the
need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (Arti-
cle 52, para. 1). Rights corresponding with the rights
granted under the European Convention on Human
Rights shall have the same meaning and scope as those
rights, although Union law can provide greater protec-
tion (Article 52, para. 3). Recognised fundamental rights
43. See Baker and Pistone, above n. 24; G. Kofler, M. Poiares Maduro & P.
Pistone (eds.), Human Rights and Taxation in Europe and the World, a
publication of the Group for Research on European and International
Taxation (<www. greit -tax. eu>). See also ‘CFE: Towards Greater Fair-
ness in Taxation: A Model Taxpayer Charter’ at <www. taxpayercharter.
com> and P. Baker and P. Pistone, ‘BEPS Action 16: The Taxpayers’
Right to an Effective Legal Remedy Under European Law in Cross-Bor-
der Situations’, 5-6 EC Tax Review 335 (2016).
44. Directive 2011/16/EU.
45. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, (OJ) 2010 C83/02 and again in (OJ)
2012 C326/391.
derived from the constitutional traditions common to
EU Member States shall be interpreted in harmony
with those traditions (Article 52, para. 4).
Good tax administration takes into account a certain
protection of taxpayers’ confidential information. Most
countries recognise the confidentiality of information
given by taxpayers and consequently impose strict
secrecy obligations on their administration.
The requesting state has to decide which taxpayer rights
may be involved and how these rights can be best pro-
tected. In the competent authority letter, as the starting
point for the investigation, the requesting state will pro-
vide information on the taxable subject and the rele-
vance of the requested information for the assessment
procedure. The Commentary on the OECD MTC takes
the position that the competent authority letter is sub-
ject to a duty of confidentiality.46 The Commentary
authorises the disclosure of a minimum of information
(but not disclosure of the letter itself) if such is necessa-
ry to enable the requested state to obtain or provide the
information to the requesting state, without frustrating
the efforts of the requesting state. In this, the Commen-
tary seems to take precedence over domestic due process
rules as, under the latter rules, the competent authority
letter is not generally privacy-protected information,
given that it is relevant for reviewing the legality of the
investigation order and so normally needs to be dis-
closed. Only in exceptional circumstances, when disclo-
sure would threaten the success of the investigation,
may non-disclosure be appropriate. Having received the
results of the request, the requesting state then has to
protect the personal rights of third parties in the reques-
ted state. The personal rights of legal entities are specif-
ically emphasised in this respect. Legal entities do not
enjoy a high level of protection as they lack the dignity
of a moral person. However, although the privacy article
in the ECFR (Article 7) applies only to natural persons,
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) extends the protection of home and corre-
spondence to legal persons.
The requested state, which is obliged to perform the
request, has to decide whether to use all its discretionary
powers to obtain the information and whether it needs
to consider the safeguards offered by the requesting
state to the taxpayer in respect of the information sup-
plied. This is because the obligation to perform the
request is subject to certain restrictions.47 These restric-
tions must be taken seriously as national sovereignty
may conflict with the principle of mutual trust and good
faith, as applied in international law.48 Where the law
does not provide straightforward procedural protection,
the general principle of equality of arms serves as an
46. Para. 11, Commentary.
47. Article 26(3) OECD MTC limits the main rule by releasing the requested
state from the obligation to disclose information in certain circumstan-
ces (e.g. a sovereignty clause, reciprocity clause, privilege against self-
incrimination, information that cannot be obtained in normal adminis-
trative procedure, and if disclosure would conflict with public order).
48. Article 26 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and A. Aust,
Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd ed. (2007), 179.
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arbitrator in the adjudication of rights: in other words,
there should always be a balance between taxpayers’
obligations to disclose non-public information and tax-
payers’ rights to retain a level of dignity, free from state
interference. The global tax governance institutions,
however, do not seem to recognise any right of the indi-
vidual in the requested state to be free from interference
by that state for the purposes of assisting in the enforce-
ment of the requesting state’s tax laws. Indeed, the
Global Transparency Forum has specifically ordered
states to restrict domestic due process rules that assist
subjects in the requested state to defend their basic
rights.
3.3 Confidentiality and Data Protection
The Terms of Reference recognise the importance of
confidentiality for the subject in two elements. On the
one hand, they protect the confidentiality of information
collected and exchanged and impose the same confiden-
tiality norms for received information on the requesting
state as the latter provides for its own information under
its own laws (i.e. the principle of equal treatment).49 On
the other hand, the requirement that only information
foreseeably relevant for the requesting state can be
exchanged implies a proportionality test. In this way,
the interests of third-party informers (no obligation to
provide more than is relevant) and taxpayers (purpose
restriction) are protected. However, the Standard also
undermines the rights of third parties and taxpayers by
extending the restricted purpose to ‘other use’ if such
other use is permitted under the laws of the requesting
state and the requested state agrees to such use. Neither
the taxpayer nor the third party has any say in this other
use. The OECD standard of protection then applying is
the standard of the requesting state, even if the reques-
ted state itself has a higher standard of confidentiality.
This is a strange provision because it may reduce the
protection afforded by the requested state to the taxpay-
er or the third-party informant.
In the EU, this will lead to a conflict between the rights
afforded to taxpayers and the obligations of the reques-
ted state under the OECD MTC or similar arrange-
ments. Within the EU legal framework, the protection
in the receiving country should be at least equal to the
protection afforded by the state seeking to exchange the
information. If protection is not on an equal footing, the
exchange should be restricted. In the past, existing dif-
ferences between EU Member States prohibited the
processing of personal data. The Data Protection Direc-
tive (95/46/EC) (DPD) consequently sought to equal-
ise the differences by imposing equivalent protection in
all Member States.50 Under Article 25(1) DPD, transfer
to third countries (outside the EU) may take place only
if the third country in question ensures an adequate lev-
el of protection of the personal information. In the
famous case of Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner,
the CJEU ruled that the legal framework of protection
49. Article 26(2) OECD MTC.
50. DPD, preamble 7 and 8.
against abuse in the United States was generally not suf-
ficient to allow information to be transferred to and held
in the United States by Facebook.51
Contrary to its general obligations under international
agreements (the United States has undertaken to
exchange information on deposit interest with 86 juris-
dictions), the United States has only qualified 18 juris-
dictions with which it will exchange information on
non-alien deposit interest.52 Having reviewed its domes-
tic confidentiality provisions, the United States has only
partly confirmed the reciprocity promised under the
FATCA IGA agreements. For the vast majority of
countries, it is correct to state that more of their taxpay-
ers’ assets are held in or through the United States than
vice versa. Some governments are denied reciprocity by
the United States because these countries use their tax
administration, and the information received from it,
against citizens or foreign competitors, while some tax
administrators selectively use tax information against
political rivals.53 Some governments simply lack the
capacity to protect tax information because of a lack of
resources, lack of protection against cybercriminals, or a
lack of will, while others do not consider tax information
confidential or pass it on to other government depart-
ments. William Byrnes has therefore concluded that the
Protocol amending the Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Assistance in Tax Matters (allowing the auto-
matic exchange of information) may potentially lead to
substantially more identity theft, crime, industrial
espionage, financial fraud and suppression of political
opponents and religious or ethnic minorities by authori-
tarian and corrupt governments, including Russia, Chi-
na, Colombia and Nigeria.54
On the other hand, the restriction to the effect that the
information received is to be used only for tax purposes
has been criticised by the Financial Transparency Coali-
tion on the grounds that this prevents prosecution of
criminals for financial offences other than strict tax
fraud.55 A recent EU Commission initiative for intensi-
fied collaboration between anti-money-laundering
enforcement officers and tax authorities is another sign
of ‘creep’ in the restricted purpose.56 In this way, the
fight against tax evasion through transparency and
51. CJEU 6 October 2015, C-362/14 (Schrems v. Data Protection Commis-
sioner), Celex 62014CJ0362.
52. See W. Byrnes, White, Grey and Black Hat Tax Administrations – A
proposal for a U.S. Carrot & Stick Approach, Part I, Kluwer International
Blog, 16 August 2016 referring to Rev. Proc. 2012-24, superseded by
Rev. Proc. 2014-64 listing as appropriate jurisdictions Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Guernsey, Ireland, Isle of Man,
Italy, Jersey, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and
the United Kingdom for interest paid after 1 January 2015.
53. See, as a general example, ECtHR case Yukos v. Russia, Appl. No.
14902/04.
54. See Byrnes, above n. 52.
55. See <https:// financialtransparency. org/ information -exchange -needs -go
-beyond -tax/ > (accessed 13 February 2017).
56. See Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as
regards access to anti-money-laundering information by tax authorities,
Celex 52016PC0452. Especially targeted here is information on the
beneficial owners of intermediary entities and other relevant customer
due diligence information, if the authorities are to effectively identify
and address tax evasion.
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exchange of information is becoming part of a larger
objective: the prevention of illicit flows of funds.57
3.4 Legal Qualification Process of EOIR
The mutual administrative assistance treaties concluded
by states are more than just inter-state agreements as
they also create obligations for a state’s citizens to coop-
erate by providing personal protected information to
other states for the purposes of enforcement and collect-
ing taxes in those other states. In this way, national laws
are put in service of the interests of other states, with
the result that one state exercises transnational authority
with the permission of the other state. However, while
international cooperation has advantages for both the
requesting and the requested state, the burdens are not
equally shared. Some states more often than not find
themselves on the requesting side, while others are on
the requested side. This requires differential
treatment.58
The current view of the CJEU (in Sabou)59 and the
ECtHR (in Othymia)60 is that the exchange of informa-
tion upon request does not constitute an act giving rise
to an obligation to hear the person concerned (taxpayer)
either before the investigation takes place or before the
results of the investigation are exchanged with the
requesting country. The party concerned is not entitled
to receive notification prior to the exchange: ‘It cannot
be a requirement of Article 8 of the Convention
[ECHR] that prior notice of lawful tax investigations or
exchanges of tax-related information be given to all per-
sons potentially implicated’ (Othymia, 44). In most
countries, the exchange of information process is seen as
mere ‘fact gathering’ and not as a proper administrative
procedure.61 This underlines that the protective rights
are granted only at the level of the requesting state. Both
courts also make a distinction between the ‘investiga-
tion’ stage and the ‘contentious’ stage. A request for
information forms part of the investigation stage: ‘is part
of the process of collecting information’.62 The rights of
defence are consequently seen as coming into play only
when the process enters the contentious stage, which
begins when the taxpayer is sent the proposed adjust-
ment.63 In the opinion of the CJEU, respect of the tax-
57. In their statement of 14 April 2016, the five EU Ministers of Finance
attending the G20 focused on the fight against tax evasion, aggressive
tax planning and money laundering and underlined the common pat-
terns in money laundering, tax evasion and illicit finance.
58. See M. Keen and J. Ligthart, ‘Information Sharing and International
Taxation: A Primer’, 13 International Tax and Public Finance 81-110;
Discussion Paper, University of Tilburg, CentER, Discussion Paper No.
2004-117; M. Keen and J. Ligthart, ‘Revenue Sharing and Information
Exchange under Non-Discriminatory Taxation’ (June 2005), CentER Dis-
cussion Paper No. 2005-69.
59. Case C-276/12, Sabou. ECLI:EU:C:2013:678. See also L.E.C. Neve, case
note on Sabou in AB 2014/37.
60. ECtHR 16 June 2015, Othymia Investments BV, Appl. No. 75292-10.
See also T. Barkhuysen and M.L. van Emmerik, case note on Othymia
in AB 2017/2, who plead for re-introduction of the notice of intention
to exchange.
61. X. Oberson, IFA General Report 2013, ‘Exchange of Information and
Cross-border Cooperation between Tax Authorities’, 54.
62. Case C-276/12, Sabou, ECLI:EU:C:2013:678, rec. 42.
63. Ibid., rec. 39.
payer’s rights of defence does not require the taxpayer
to take part in the request for information or to be heard
when inquiries are being carried out or before the
requested Member State sends the information to the
requesting Member State.64 The positions adopted by
the CJEU and ECtHR are currently, however, subject
to debate.
It is argued that the taxpayer has no right to be
informed or to participate in any way in the process of
EOI decision-making because this process is part of the
administrative/procedural stage of an investigation. At
that point, there is no discussion and, therefore, no right
to interfere. That approach, however, is flawed,65 and
the error is evident in Sabou. The actions taken by the
requested state to obtain the information from the infor-
mation holder cannot be reviewed by the adjudicating
court in the requesting state for their compatibility with
the rights granted under the ECFR or ECHR, given
that the sovereignty clause prevents a court in the
requesting state from reviewing acts of state of another
state. This is a flaw in the international process. Howev-
er, the domestic court does have procedural autonomy
to evaluate evidence obtained in the exchange proce-
dure.66
The taxpayer has general rights to privacy and confi-
dentiality at all stages of the process; there is, for exam-
ple, a prohibition on exchanging a trade, business,
industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade
process. But how can an infringement of this provision
be challenged if there is no access to a court?
The adjudication of conflicts in EOI processes is based
on a national procedural (administrative) framework,
whereas the exchange in substance is based on interna-
tional commitments. In this context of European (and
global) legal pluralism, one cannot ignore a parallel
denationalisation of political, and especially legislative,
institutions and the importance of reconnecting legisla-
tive and judicial functions across levels of governance. A
further question, therefore, is whether such adjudication
should take account of the transnational environment in
which the exchange takes place and, if so, what effects
this will have on national procedures? In national proce-
dures, domestic authorities often have a carve-out for
tax procedures. Such procedures often do not follow the
general principles of administrative law in that they fre-
quently violate requirements of administrative due
process. The basic requirements of administrative due
process are threefold: (a) the requirement to carry out a
procedure; (b) the right to be heard in that procedure;
and (c) the requirement to give reasons for the proce-
dure.67
3.5 Exceptionality
In searching for ‘fairness’ in the international exchange
procedure we face claims for ‘exceptionality’ by the
64. Sabou, rec. 44.
65. Baker and Pistone (2015), above n. 24.
66. Case C-437/13, Unitrading, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2318, rec. 35.
67. See G. della Cananea, Due Process of Law beyond the State (OUP,
2016).
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competent authorities in these proceedings, either
claims for confidentiality of communication, or claims
for exceptions to transparency. The Global Transparen-
cy Forum’s attitude is a good example of the kind of
‘exceptionality’ that the Forum is requesting for itself
by seeking to remove basic rights, such as the right to be
notified of an intended EOI, and the right to challenge
any decision in this field. The EU Commission is anoth-
er good example of the kind of ‘exceptionality’ discussed
here. In the preamble to the Directive on Administra-
tive Cooperation 2011/16/EU (DAC 1), the Commis-
sion advises Member States to restrict transparency by
invoking the general exception of Article 13(1)(e) Data
Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD).68 This means,
in my opinion, that the Commission is advising Member
States, when implementing the DAC 1, also to include a
general exception to the notification requirement fore-
seen in the DPD. In this way, a right that is given to a
subject (the right to access data) is restricted without
any procedural compensation. Invoking the priority of
national interests, especially in taxation matters, for a
general and generic purpose is contrary to the spirit of
the DPD.69 I recognise that the levying of taxes is of
great interest for any state, but that interest cannot be
regarded as legitimate justification for denying due
process when fundamental civil rights are at stake.
3.6 Infringements of Civil Rights
In the past, international cooperation between fiscal
authorities of contracting states was often seen as a
means of strengthening powers to enforce domestic tax
laws, with the exchange of information originally
restricted to readily available or accessible information
for which no investigation and cooperation of another
subject was necessary. Over time, however, the con-
tracting parties’ commitments extended to an obligation
to cooperate in providing information for which an
investigation was necessary. This, however, touches
upon the private sphere of the individual, which is when
the data and privacy protection provided for in Article 8
ECHR70 and Articles 7 and 8 ECFR71 come into play.
The international exchange of information can result in
an infringement of third parties’ rights through the dis-
closure, for example, of protected information. Howev-
er, although an individual has standing under the
ECHR if his rights are infringed by a Member State of
the Council of Europe, it is difficult to allocate responsi-
bility for the infringement in a transnational investiga-
68. Preamble 27. However, it is appropriate to consider limitations of cer-
tain rights and obligations laid down by Directive 95/46/EC in order to
safeguard the interests referred to in Article 13(1)(e) of that Directive.
Such limitations are necessary and proportionate in view of the poten-
tial loss of revenue for Member States and the crucial importance of
information covered by this Directive for the effectiveness of the fight
against fraud.
69. Article 13, Exemptions and Restrictions (1) reads: ‘(e) an important eco-
nomic or financial interest of a Member State or of the European Union,
including monetary, budgetary and taxation matters’.
70. ECHR, ETS No. 4 and subsequent amendments in ETS 44, 45, 55, 118,
155, 140 and 194.
71. EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Celex 12012PTXT, OJ 2012/C
326/02.
tion involving cooperation between two or more states.
The question arises as to which state is responsible for
any violation of the rights of persons protected under
the ECHR if a request for assistance is to be complied
with. Each state is responsible for actions within its own
jurisdiction. But is this appropriate if an act in State A is
seen as preparatory for a decision in State B? This is
important because qualifying an act of State A as ‘pre-
paratory’ in nature deprives the subject of the opportu-
nity to take legal action against the act of State A, while
the subject is also unable to have the act reviewed in
State B.72
Ensuring the legal protection of citizens is a collective
responsibility of all Member States within the Council
of Europe. However, ECtHR case law does not accept
common responsibility, but instead divides the respon-
sibility of the states.73 The fact that the ECtHR found a
common responsibility of Denmark and Turkey for the
extradition procedure in Sari, but did not find individu-
al neglect meant that the ECtHR was unable to decide
on either state’s responsibility for not hearing the case
within a ‘reasonable time’. This may create complica-
tions in composite procedures or transnational acts.
States have an inter-state obligation to uphold the rule
of law. The ECHR comprises a network of mutual and
bilateral undertakings, while the objective obligations of
states must benefit from collective enforcement.74 In my
opinion, this means that both states in EOI procedures
are responsible for proper performance of the process
and for upholding the rule of law. Legitimacy deficits
must, therefore, have an impact on the value of the evi-
dence collected in such a process.
Although the use of evidence obtained contrary to the
provisions of the ECHR creates responsibilities for
states under the ECHR,75 this does not mean that evi-
dence obtained in violation of ECHR obligations cannot
be used in the adjudication process.76 The responsibility
of the state is for the reciprocal engagements between
contracting states, as well as to protect subjects within
its jurisdiction against infringements by other subjects
or other states. An example of when the transnational
element comes into play can be seen in Ireland v. UK,77
when Ireland challenged the UK for not observing the
latter’s commitments under the ECHR. The Court con-
firmed that the UK was obliged to observe the ECHR
commitments, but did not find a violation of such com-
mitments.
In the EU, the fundamental rights set out in the ECFR
protect citizens against infringements by EU institu-
tions and infringements by states in the execution of
EU-based regulations (primary or subsidiary), whereas
72. In general, acts of a preparatory nature lack direct effect on subjects’
legal position and are, therefore, not justiciable.
73. Sari v. Turkey and Denmark, ECtHR, No. 21889/93.
74. Ireland v. UK, ECtHR, No. 5310/72 para. 239.
75. X v. Germany, European Commission of Human Rights (EComHR), No.
1611/62.
76. Especially in procedures where criminal or administrative penalties can
be imposed, the ECtHR will consider the ‘fairness’ of the procedure in
total. See P.G. & J.H. v. United Kingdom, ECtHR No. 44787/98.
77. Ireland v. UK, ECtHR, No. 5310/71.
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ECHR rights impose both positive and negative obliga-
tions on states. The CJEU and ECtHR also have differ-
ent jurisdictions in terms of subjects and subject mat-
ters. Such differences can be observed with respect to
jurisdiction (Member State action versus EU citizens),
the scope of review, and the effect and enforcement of
judgements. Article 6 ECHR (right of review by court)
deals only with civil and penal claims, rather than with
the exercising of public authority in tax matters (unless
there are monetary effects).78
The EU has changed bilateral and multilateral coopera-
tion, such that its perspective now centres on the inter-
ests of Union citizens. We therefore now need princi-
ples that are much more oriented towards citizens’ fun-
damental rights than to the economic well-being of the
EU Member States. As seen in Van Gend & Loos, the
subjects of the new legal order comprise not only the
Member States, but also their nationals.79 We have thus
moved from a Member State approach to a Union
approach, and this influences subjects’ procedural
rights. But we continue to see a concentration of legal
remedies in the requesting state, as reflected in the
repeal of the notification procedure and the prohibition
of a judicial review in the Dutch International Assis-
tance (Levying of Taxes) Act [WIBB], both of which
are contrary to the interests of the subjects.
3.7 Competence of ECtHR and CJEU as Regards
Procedural Tax Law
Human rights and the protection of these rights have
moved from the social platform to the legal platform.
We are currently also seeing a constitutionalisation of
international law, whereby constitutionally protected
civil rights are becoming increasingly important in the
application of international law. This constitutional per-
spective on the body of international law, especially that
part of international law dealing with governance, has
been gaining importance ever since international law
started institutionally regulating the conduct of subjects
worldwide. This new perspective on international law
can also be seen from a global administrative law per-
spective, with the intention being to apply the principles
of administrative and constitutional law in the field of
international law, and the core idea being that the exer-
cising of institutional authority should be restrained and
controlled by procedures and processes under law. On
the transnational level, individual autonomy should be
protected against the authority exercised by the state
and its agents in international institutions and networks.
This greater focus on human rights in international law
applies also in tax law. Daniel Gutmann provides two
reasons for this recent trend:80 first, the new threats
increasingly linked to globalisation and the reinforce-
78. Ferrazzini v. Italy, ECtHR, No. 44759/98.
79. Case, 26/62 Van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1 (direct effect for the
individuals).
80. D. Gutmann, ‘Taking Human Rights Seriously: Some Introductory
Words on Human Rights, Taxation and EU’, in G. Kofler, M. Poiares
Maduro & P. Pistone (eds.), Human Rights and Taxation in Europe and
the World (IBFD, 2011), ch. 6.
ment of tax administrations’ powers, and, second, the
promotion of social goals such as ‘solidarity’ or environ-
mental protection, and their effects on tax matters.81
Article 1, Protocol 1, of the ECHR balances the rights to
tax natural and legal persons against the state’s obliga-
tion to protect peaceful enjoyment of property. A prob-
lematic issue in this respect, however, is the legitimacy
of double taxation as no individual state can be held
responsible for the existence of double taxation, and tax-
payers are reliant on national tax authorities’ discretion
when it comes to eliminating it in practice.82
A similar field of conflict can be seen in the internation-
al procedure for the exchange of information. The
increased powers legitimately attributed to tax authori-
ties to enforce tax legislation, also in cross-border situa-
tions, need to be balanced by a symmetrical acknowl-
edgement of fundamental taxpayer rights.83 Gutmann
concludes, therefore, that the new powers of tax author-
ities should be balanced by new rights or by the correct
implementation and application of existing rights in tax
proceedings. A general reference to the important inter-
ests of states in the levying of taxes does not constitute a
substitute for neglecting taxpayers’ individual rights.
Similarly, the reference to the protection of the ‘internal
market’ in Othymia Investments BV does not prohibit
the protection of the interests of the individual.84
The right to a fair trial is dealt with in Article 6 ECHR,
while the right of review, extended to everyone, is limi-
ted in paragraph 1 to ‘the determination of his civil
rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against
him’. The ECtHR will therefore explore the civil char-
acter of tax disputes on its own, irrespective of the
nature of the rule or the origin of the competent author-
ity. The criteria used by the Court to recognise a dis-
pute as ‘civil’ are the existence of a private contract or
that the action represents a challenge to private proper-
ty. With respect to sanctions, the Court will explore the
possible penal (or repressive) character of a tax sanction.
Tax sanctions in the form of an administrative sanction
fall within the scope of Article 6 ECHR on the basis of
the general nature of the sanction, its deterrent or
repressive nature and its severity.85 Conflicts in this
field will gain importance as more and more sanctions
are based on administrative rather than penal law provi-
sions.
In a mutual legal assistance case between Switzerland as
the requested state and Italy as the requesting state, the
European Commission on Human Rights was asked to
decide on the application of Article 6 ECHR with
respect to the subject’s rights of defence (including the
right to review documents). The Commission decided
that the Swiss competent authority’s decision related
exclusively to the obligations assumed by Switzerland
under international agreements. The procedure to
oppose this decision (G.A. & A.M. v. Switzerland) thus
81. Gutmann, above n. 80, at 108.
82. Ibid., at 109.
83. Ibid., at 110.
84. ECtHR, Othymia Investments, No. 75292/10, para. 41.
85. ECtHR 24 February 1994, Bendenoum, Appl. No. 12547/86.
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escapes the application of Article 6 ECHR.86 The proce-
dure of mutual administrative assistance for EOI is
often seen as similar to a procedure under a mutual legal
assistance treaty. Article 6 ECHR will therefore not
apply directly (by reference to G.A. & A.M. v. Switzer-
land) to an exchange of information procedure that is
not of civil or penal origin. Nevertheless, the due proc-
ess principles derived from Article 6 ECHR will exer-
cise influence on domestic judicial procedures. For a
different view of CJEU on this issue, see the following
discussion on the Berlioz case.
3.8 Berlioz Case – CJEU C-682/15: Important
Issues Decided by CJEU
A case that provides a good overview of the conflicting
interests discussed above is that of Berlioz Investment
Fund S.A., which has recently been decided by the
CJEU. Berlioz, as a third party, is obliged by the laws of
Luxembourg to reply to questions of the competent
authority. Under the amended legislation, Berlioz can-
not object to the request, nor ask for judicial review,
while refusing to cooperate attracts a fine of €250,000.
Berlioz refused to reply to certain questions and was
fined. It subsequently asked for judicial review of the
fine and the underlying order. I will explain the ques-
tions, the Attorney-General’s advice to the CJEU and
the ruling of the CJEU below. The decision was taken
on 16 May 2017.87
The CJEU has been called on, in a preliminary ruling
request, implicitly to decide on the validity of recent
amendments of procedural laws in Luxembourg. In the
case of Berlioz (C-682/15) the CJEU has been asked to
answer six questions relating to a request from France to
Luxembourg for exchange of information. The ques-
tions 3 and 5 of the Luxembourg Court Administrative
were taken together by the CJEU.
Essentially, the ruling of the CJEU was as follows:
i. The first question relates to the application of the
ECFR. In order for it to be applicable, the scope of
the ECFR must be analysed under article 51. The
ECFR is applicable when Union law is implemen-
ted. The CJEU concludes that the ECFR is appli-
cable because Member States are required to take
every necessary measure to guarantee the effective-
ness of the Directive on Administrative Coopera-
tion 2011/16/EU (DAC 1). ‘A mechanism for
imposing sanctions is most certainly a necessary
measure to ensure the effectiveness of the system
for the exchange of information established by
Directive 2011/16.’88 In the judgement of Sabou,
the CJEU confirmed that the rules on requests for
information and on the use of that information form
part of the application of EU law. In that case the
86. EComHR 1 December 1986, G.A. & A.M. v. Switzerland, Appl. No.
11514/85. Its prospective value, however, is limited as the Commission
gave an importance level indication of only 3. As the decision was a
non-receivable decision, no appeal to the ECtHR was possible in those
days.
87. CJEU, 16-5-2017, Berlioz (C-682/15), ECLI:EU:C:2017:373.
88. Ibid., rec. 41.
CJEU considered that ‘the questions referred …
concern[ed] the implementation of EU law and
[that] the Court [had] jurisdiction to examine the
application, in [that] context, of fundamental
rights’.89 The applicability of the ECFR is thus
confirmed.
ii. The second question concerns the right to an effec-
tive remedy under Article 47 ECFR. The persons
on whom a fine was imposed question the validity
of the request for information. The issue here is
whether the investigation into the validity of the
information request is conditional upon a breach of
a specific right or freedom guaranteed in the ECFR.
The right to an effective remedy is a general princi-
ple of law and the Court can thus review whether
the measure is in conformity with the Treaties
(TFEU and TEU), with general principles of law
and with fundamental rights. Thus if the request
for information is made in the context of a proce-
dure that constitutes the implementing of the law of
the Union, the Court can review the legality of that
request.90
iii. The third question, taken together with the fifth
question, asks whether the national court has
‘unlimited jurisdiction’ to assess the proportionality
of the penalty and the possibility to examine the
legality of the information order on which the pen-
alty is based. The court must have jurisdiction to
examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the
dispute before it. It thus cannot be the case that the
court is restricted in reviewing the order for infor-
mation. For two reasons, the court hearing the
action against the pecuniary administrative penalty
must be able to examine the legality of the informa-
tion order on which the penalty is based:
a. the court is not bound by the administrative
order, and
b. the legality of the order is unmistakably a ques-
tion of law.
The CJEU further reviews whether the review,
which the tax authority and the court of the reques-
ted state must carry out, is limited to the procedural
regularity of the request for information. As the
request has the legitimate objective of combating
tax evasion and tax avoidance pursued by Directive
2011/16, the court must be capable only of verify-
ing, on the basis of a brief examination, that the
information order is based on a request for informa-
tion that demonstrates a link between, on the one
hand, the information requested, the taxpayer con-
cerned and any third party asked to provide infor-
mation and, on the other, the tax objective pursued.
In order to entail a finding of illegality, the deficien-
cy between the request for information and the tax
objective must be manifest. This means that the
court does not have to confirm the information sta-
ted as facts in the request. It may rely on the stated
89. CJEU, 22-10-2013, Sabou (C-276/12), ECLI:EU:C:2013:678), rec. 27.
90. CJEU, 16-5-2017, Berlioz (C-682/15), ECLI:EU:C:2017:373, rec. 52.
101
Leo E.C. Neve doi: 10.5553/ELR.000086 - ELR December 2017 | No. 2
facts. A request is only illegal when the tax objec-
tive is not manifest.91
iv. The fourth question concerns the scope of the con-
cept of ‘foreseeably relevant’. Is ‘foreseeable rele-
vance’ a condition of the validity of the request for
information? The concept places a limitation on the
obligation to answer a request and constitutes the
criterion by reference to which the legality of the
information order should be examined by a tribunal
for the purposes of Article 47 of the ECFR. The
concept is thus a condition that the request must
satisfy.92
v. The sixth and last question of the referring court
asks about disclosure of the competent authority
letter. The adversarial principle is a fundamental
principle as it permits the exercise of the rights of
defence. The link between the requested informa-
tion and the tax objective pursued by the requesting
authority is necessarily developed in the request for
information. The initial request for information
made by the requesting state must necessarily be
brought to the attention of the tribunal hearing the
action against the pecuniary penalty, as otherwise it
would be unable to carry out the review of legality
required by Article 47 ECFR. But the request need
not necessarily be brought to the attention of the
third party as it cannot be precluded that communi-
cation of the request for information to the reques-
ted third party might damage the effectiveness of
the exchange of information or reduce the prospects
of success of the investigation carried out by the
requesting authority. Disclosure may consequently
be restricted if those reasons are imminent. The
restriction on the disclosure should be ‘necessary’
in order to preserve the fundamental right of anoth-
er individual or to safeguard an important public
interest. Combating tax evasion and tax avoidance
constitutes such an important public interest. But
the competent authority has to prove to the courts
that the interests of the state would be compro-
mised by a precise and full disclosure to the person
concerned of the grounds which constitute the basis
of the decision at issue.93 The minimum informa-
tion that must be provided to the party shall there-
fore include at least: (a) the identity of the person
under examination or investigation; (b) the tax pur-
pose for which the information is sought.
As can be seen from the above questions referred by the
Luxembourg Court of Appeal and the ruling of the
CJEU, the amendments imposed by the Global Trans-
parency Forum on Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
other countries in the peer review report are currently
illegitimate as these measures preclude a party from
access to judicial review by a Court. Given the require-
ment of Article 19 TEU and given the fact that
exchange of information for tax purposes is a field cov-
91. Ibid., rec. 89.
92. Ibid., rec. 74.
93. Ibid., rec. 101.
ered by Union law, the Member States must provide
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection.
Therefore, the rule of law is applicable also to the global
EOIR Standard as reflected in the DAC.
3.9 Section Conclusion
This section on the rights of defence has shown that the
Global Forum does not recognise due process rights of
the individual. There is a tendency to claim an excep-
tional status, owing to the important interests of state
that are at stake. Slowly, however, the position of the
individual subject is becoming recognised as being of
legal importance. As the order to provide information
has an impact on the subject’s legal position, while non-
performance attracts a penalty, an order to provide
information should be seen as an administrative act. The
subject’s evolving position is also reflected in the ruling
of the CJEU, who now finds that the legality of an order
to provide information should be subject to scrutiny by
an independent court.
4 Legitimacy in Global
Governance of Tax
4.1 Introduction
After the Second World War, international policymak-
ers pursued a limited form of internationalisation of
their economies with the establishment of the Bretton
Woods/GATT institutions, which subjugated interna-
tional economic integration to the needs and demands of
national economic management and democratic
politics.94 From 1980 onwards, this strategy changed
dramatically as global policy began to be driven by an
agenda of ‘deep’ integration, elimination of barriers to
trade and capital movements. This ‘deep’ economic
integration cannot be achieved in situations where
nation states and democratic policies exert considerable
force.95 Globalisation of trade and capital requires glob-
alisation of governance, which in itself restrains national
sovereignty.
Global governance seeks to integrate the nation-state
system with democratic politics and economic and polit-
ical integration. In the view of Dani Rodrik, however,
only two of these three aims are possible.96 Accordingly,
it will be very difficult to integrate national constitution-
al rights and global regulations without any democratic
foundation. Global governance lacks administrative fair-
ness for the subjects of the regulations. The protection
of subjects’ interests is subordinated to the efficiency of
the procedure. According to Rodrik, a nation-state sys-
tem and democracy are not compatible with economic
integration. He suggests, therefore, to limit the political
integration and have more rules on the economic inte-
94. D. Rodrik, ‘Feasible Globalizations’, NBER Working Paper No. 9129,
September 2002 JEL No. F0, 3.
95. Ibid., at 2.
96. Ibid., at 14.
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gration until such time as democratic principles and the
rule of law become an integral part of global integration.
This questions the legitimacy of global governance, as it
currently operates, in the field of tax.
4.2 Legitimacy
Global governance in tax brings with it a tension
between local and global obligations, with the global
standard for administrative cooperation between states
being implemented domestically and forced upon local
taxpayers. The original inter-state obligation to cooper-
ate with the home state in enforcing bilateral treaty obli-
gations has been converted into a global obligation for
taxpayers to assist in suppressing tax evasion worldwide.
Taxpayer have thus become instrumental in achieving
the goal of global equivalence. The same taxpayers,
however, wish to balance their obligations under inter-
national law with their global constitutional right to
defend themselves against intrusions into their private
and family life, and generally to exercise their civic right
to respect and dignity, also against interests of other
states. The international law enforced upon them can
demand compliance only if the rule enforced by that law
is itself legitimate. By that I mean that the rule is demo-
cratically constituted and enforces an acceptable goal in
a fair manner. The suppression of tax evasion is certain-
ly an acceptable goal of great importance for the well-
being of all citizens of a state.97 However, that does not
make enforcement of a rule legitimate, even if it is effec-
tive. Legitimacy has both an input side (Member States
are themselves bearers of legitimacy) and an output side
(effective and efficient performance of the task). But
effective performance of a task is not sufficient to con-
stitute legitimacy if that performance violates principles
of justice as accepted in the rule of law.98
What is meant by ‘legitimacy’? The term relates to the
justification and acceptance of political authority.99
According to Bodansky, legitimacy is a third basis of
compliance between rational persuasion on the one hand
and power on the other. Legitimacy has a normative
quality in that it represents justification.
According to Samantha Besson, the key to the authority
of international law in pluralist legal orders lies in ‘lift-
ing the state veil’100 and focusing on the individual as
the ultimate subject of authority in international law.101
97. See also EComHR, X (Hardy-Spirlet) v. Belgium, Appl. No. 9804/82, 7
December 1982.
98. See also P. Baker, ‘The Rights to Confidentiality and Privacy in an Age
of Transparency: A European Perspective’, summary of talk delivered at
First International Conference on Taxpayers’ Rights held in Washington
DC in November 2015, <https:// taxpayerrightsconference. com/ wp -
content/ uploads/ 2015/ 11/ Baker_ TPRights_ PrivacyandDataProtection_
Nov2015_ 508. pdf>.
99. D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’, in R.
Wolfrum and V. Röben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (Spring-
er, 2008).
100. S. Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law – Lifting the State Veil’,
31 Sydney Law Review 343-80 (2009). Available at SSRN: <http:// ssrn.
com/ abstract= 1588040>.
101. Besson, above n. 100.
4.2.1 Kumm’s Legitimacy Concept
Mattias Kumm states that international law has moved
away from the domain of foreign affairs to a domain of
governance, and is no longer the exclusive territory of
states wishing to regulate bilateral affairs. The scope of
international law has thus expanded to fields of transna-
tional adjudication and enforcement, and this has conse-
quences for its legitimacy. Emancipation from state con-
trol requires new accountability mechanisms. Interna-
tional law is being challenged in domestic settings in the
name of democracy and constitutional self-
government.102 Kumm analyses legitimacy for four dis-
tinct principles: (i) the formal principle of international
legality; (ii) the jurisdictional principle of subsidiarity;
(iii) the procedural principle of adequate participation
and accountability, and (iv) the substantive principle of
achieving outcomes that are not in violation of funda-
mental rights and are reasonable. International law is
connected to the national constitution in a different way
from domestic law and needs, therefore, to improve its
decision-making at an international level. This can be
done, provided that the above principles are respected.
The change from bilateral affairs to governance of glob-
alisation also has an impact on the position of the sub-
ject. Governance of global developments affects the sub-
ject in that it seeks to govern the conduct of persons
beyond the state instead of to govern acts of states. As
more and more people are affected by global governance
of transnational activities, the question of the legitimacy
of the resulting rules comes to the fore.
4.2.2 Legitimacy of Global Administration of Tax
The globalisation of governance in international tax
with a view to suppressing global tax evasion can be seen
as the global administration of tax. The question then is:
Do principles of administrative law apply to this global
administration? Administrative law is meant to control
and restrain the exercising of public power. The current
view is that global governance in the area of internation-
al tax should be exercised in respect of the rule of law
and democracy. Domestic administrative action in the
field of international tax should be based on global prin-
ciples such as equality before the law, democracy and
respect for taxpayers’ rights. However, the current sour-
ces of law for international exchange of information are
mainly rules set by non-legislative bodies (the OECD
and Global Transparency Forum as government net-
works). Domestic and international elements have
become interwoven in the process of regulation, where-
by domestic constitutional rights are being exchanged
for universality of the rule. In other words, the univer-
sality of an efficient system for exchanging information
has gained priority over constitutionally protected rights
of defence. The better way would have been to re-
enforce protection of legal interests and to include civic
rights in the global rule, irrespective of the plurality of
national constitutional rights or the absence of such
102. M. Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist
Framework of Analysis’, 15(5) EJIL (2004).
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rights. In order to overcome the political trilemma of
Rodrik, global governance should be amended to incor-
porate relevant elements of nation-state constitutional
rights for the individual. These rights can be found in
global administrative law principles such as transparen-
cy, consultation, participation, rationality and legality,
effective review of rules and decisions.
International law basically has a state-oriented character.
Rather, however, than expanding horizontally to
embrace new states, it has extended itself vertically to
include individuals, groups and international organisa-
tions within its scope.103 The end of the Second World
War saw the recognition of individual responsibility
under international law without and beyond the state,
while the growing interest in human rights has contrib-
uted to the increasing role of the individual in interna-
tional law. Emphasis on the dignity of man provides an
ethical basis for international law.
4.3 Section Conclusion
In order for a rule to be legitimate, any weak legitimacy
in the constitution of the rule must be compensated by
strong procedural legitimacy in its application. As
explained earlier, the democratic legitimacy of the Glob-
al Transparency Forum is non-existent. Therefore, any
legitimacy the Global Transparency Forum may have
relates to the efficacy of the output and must be based
on respect for the rule of law.
The previous section concluded that observance of the
rule of law in the form of procedural fairness is crucial
to the legitimacy of the EOIR Standard. As we have
seen, however, that Standard does not provide for any
procedural fairness in the EOI process. For Ana Doura-
do, this conclusion constituted sufficient grounds for
stating that the EOIR Standard cannot be accepted as a
global standard. To become acceptable on a global level,
it needs to be strengthened by the addition of procedur-
al fairness, both for the taxpayer subject to an investiga-
tion and for the person ordered to cooperate in the
information collection process. As P. Baker puts it,
‘Nothing authorizes tax administrations to ignore the
rights of taxpayers.’ The provisions in the Terms of
Reference on respect for rights of information holders
(B.2) and data protection in the exchange process (C.4)
are designed to be subordinate to an efficient exchange
process. For this reason, the Global Transparency
Forum has forced some states to renounce notification
and to restrict access to justice for those wishing to chal-
lenge the legality of the exchange of information, as well
as to impose a prohibition on disclosing competent
authority letters, as evidenced by the examples given in
the opening section. The sources for the EOIR Stand-
ard and the resulting Terms of Reference do not give
the Global Transparency Forum a mandate to include
limitations on the rights of defence in the Terms of Ref-
erence. Indeed, the Global Transparency Forum has no
103. For a brief summary of the development of international law over the
centuries and decades, see M.N. Shaw, International Law, 6th ed.
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), 43-68.
executive authority to impose the above restrictions on
states that have made commitments to transparency.
The amendments made to local procedural rules as a
result of the Global Transparency Forum’s work cannot
be challenged under local law. The only remedy, there-
fore, must be sought in international customary law that
supersedes domestic law and in international and supra-
national law. Under the ECHR, persons concerned have
standing against the acting state for any infringement of
their human rights, as guaranteed by the Article 8 with
respect to natural persons and, in some instances, also
legal persons. Under the ECFR, persons concerned
have a right to respect for private life (Article 7) and to
data protection (Article 8). This protective framework
of constitutional defence rights takes priority over
national law. The ECFR comes into play if primary EU
law (TEU, TFEU or ECFR) or secondary law (DAC 1
and DPD) ‘touch’ upon national law (Article 51(1)
CFR).
5 Conclusion
The EOIR Standard for tax purposes, as developed by
the OECD and implemented through the peer review
procedures of the Global Transparency Forum, is not
legitimate because it denies the person concerned
recourse to the defence rights provided by the rule of
law. This conflict between efficiency and effectiveness
in the application of basic personal rights for the person
concerned can only be resolved by the law. In adjudicat-
ing conflicts of this nature, the courts have to take into
consideration that the rule forced upon the persons con-
cerned lacks legitimacy. The Standard should therefore
be revised to include rights of defence for the persons
concerned in the form of a right to be notified of any
intended exchange of information (now acknowledged
in M.N. and others v. San Marino), a right to have the
legality of the order reviewed by an independent court
(now acknowledged in Berlioz) and a right to data pro-
tection (now acknowledged in Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner). These rights must apply to all persons
concerned, whether they are taxpayers or third-party
informants. The level of protection afforded to the tax-
payer should be at the level of the requested state with
regard to the collection and exchange of information and
at the level of the requesting state with regard to the use
of data as evidence for the assessment.
I regard the Data Protection Directive and forthcoming
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) as con-
taining important procedural safeguards against the
improper use of exchanged data.104 Tax data may flow
freely within the EU, but a data flow outside the EU is
restricted. In my opinion, this will lead to a proliferation
104. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation) (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) OJ L 119, 4 May 2016, 1-88.
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of the EU’s data protection rules on a global scale.
Another important element of the legal protection shield
in Europe is that information obtained through adminis-
trative assistance must be reviewed for compliance with
human rights standards, as reflected in the ECHR, in
the country where that information is collected.105
In balancing the rights of the person concerned to priva-
cy and data protection against important interests of
both the requested and the requesting states, there must
be a judicial review of the requested state’s adherence to
human rights concepts of the requesting state. The pro-
tection shield’s equivalence in both states must be a con-
dition for the use of the received information in the
requesting state. This will also mean a proliferation of
European human rights norms in global exchange of
information procedures. The proportionality and neces-
sity arguments should restrict the volume of exchanges,
while the legitimacy argument should imply a thinner
version of the international tax governance rules,
including full recourse to the rule of law.
The Terms of Reference for peer review by the Global
Transparency Forum currently take no account of the
rights of the persons involved.106 This lack of legal pro-
tection of such persons violates the rule of law in respect
of due process, privacy protection and data protection.
As such, I support Ana Dourado’s conclusion that the
EOIR Standard lacks legitimacy.
105. For an example of such a review, see ECtHR 7 July 2015, M.N. and oth-
ers v. San Marino, Appl. No. 28005/12, where the court imposed a
notification obligation on San Marino prior to the exchange of informa-
tion in order to protect the right to a judicial review of the order’s legali-
ty.
106. With regard to the preservation of confidentiality in the exchange pro-
cess, recent OECD reports (BEPS Action 5 on Harmful Tax Practices:
Transparency Framework – Peer review documents, OECD, 2017, at 13
and BEPS Action 13 on Country-by-Country Reporting – Peer review
documents, OECD 2017, 15-16) have included more extensive terms of
reference elements than those of the Global Transparency Forum, espe-
cially in respect of the domestic enforcement of the confidentiality rules.
Nevertheless, those elements are still insufficient to comply with the
stricter EU data protection rules set out in the GDPR.
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